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DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS IN POLICE 
SHOWUP PRACTICES 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recently, in United States v. Wade,l Gilbert v. California,2 and 
Stovall v. Denno,3 the Supreme Court dealt with the long-neglected 
problems besetting police lineups and showups.4 The Court recognized 
that suggestive police practices could lead to misidentification at a 
pretrial confrontationu which, in turn, could adversely affect the valid-
ity of a subsequent in-court identification.6 Thus, to afford defense 
attorneys a chance to limit the use of suggestive lineup practices7 and 
to assure that they have sufficient knowledge of pretrial identifications 
to adequately cross-e:-;amine identifying witnesses at trial,8 Wade and 
Gilbert held that a pretrial confrontation conducted after indictment 
occurred at a "critical stage" of the criminal proceeding and, therefore, 
that the sixth amendment required counsel's presence at such con-
frontations.0 In order to effectuate this right, the Court ruled not only 
that evidence of a pretrial identification conducted without counsel 
was inadmissible per se,10 but also that any subsequent in-court identi-
fication was inadmissible unless the prosecution could prove by "clear 
and convincing" evidence that such identification had a basis inde-
pendent of the improper pretrial confrontation.U 
1 388 u.s. 218 (1967). 
2 388 u.s. 263 (1967). 
3 388 u.s. 293 (1967). 
4 In the lineup a witness views a group of persons and is asked to pick out 
the guilty party if he is present. In the showup a lone suspect is presented to a 
witness who is asked whether or not the party presented is the criminal being 
sought. P. Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 27-28, 40-41 (1968). 
G United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-39 (1967). 
G "Moreover, '[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has 
picked out the accused at the lineup, he is not likely to go back on his word later 
on, so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant 
evidence) for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the 
trial.' " Id. at 229, quoting Williams & Hammelmann, Identification Parades-!, 
1963 Crim. L. Rev. (Eng.) 479, 482. 
7 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236 (1967), noted that the "presence 
of counsel itself can often avert prejudice." 
s Id. at 230-36. 
o Id. at 236-37. 
10 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967). 
11 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1967). Wade dealt merely 
\\ith the inadmissibility of an in-court identification made by a witness who had 
previously identified him at a pretrial lineup conducted in derogation of Wade's 
newly found right to counsel. The state did not attempt to offer into evidence the 
fact that a pretrial identification had been made. Gilbert dealt directly with the 
admissibility of a pretrial identification conducted in derogation of the right to 
counsel, as well as with that of the subsequent in-court identification. The pretrial 
identification secured in derogation of defendant's right to counsel was, unlike any 
subsequent identification to be offered in court, absolutely inadmissible, since it 
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Stovall limited the holdings of Wade and Gilbert to prospective 
application.12 However, the Court went on to note that, aside from con-
travening the sixth amendment, a pretrial confrontation could be so 
conducted as to violate due process of lawP Citing but a single author-
ity in support of its position,H the Court stated that the well-established 
test for determining whether such a violation had been committed was 
whether the procedures employed at the identification were "unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification.mro 
Deciding that the showup used to procure Stovall's identification did not 
violate this due process test, the Court elaborated on its standard: 
" [A] claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a con-
frontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
it ... . m 6 
Far from providing clear criteria for deciding when a pretrial 
identification violates due process, the Stovall test poses difficult prob-
lems of application for lower federal and state courtsP What are the 
significant factors that are to be considered under the totality test? 
Once a violation of due process is found, what are the evidentiary impli-
cations? Is the evidence of the illegally conducted identification abso-
lutely inadmissible? Is the subsequent in-court identification presumed 
inadmissible by analogy to Wade and Gilbert? In the alternative, are 
either or both types of evidence treated differently than their counter-
parts in right to counsel cases? And finally, if courts are to hold that 
a "tainted" in-court identification is presumed inadmissible, what type 
was "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the pri-
mary] illegality."' Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967). 
Where a witness' testimony that he identified defendant at a pretrial lineup is 
treated as hearsay, one does not reach the problem of the propriety of an c:~Celu­
sionary rule grounded in due process or right to counsel. Hearsay was not a prob-
lem in Gilbert, since California has a statutory exception to the hearsay rule which 
would have allowed evidence of the pretrial identification of the defendant had 
it not been elicited in violation of due process. Cal. Evid. Code § 1238 (\Vest 
1966). See also N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 393-b (McKinney 1958). 
12 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-301 (1967). 
13 Id. at 301-02. 
14 Id. at 302. The authority the Court cited was Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 
199 (4th Cir. 1966), which invalidated a voice showup on the ground that it was 
so unnecessarily suggestive as to violate due process of law. 
15 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,301-02 (1967). 
16 Id. at 302. 
17 Cf. Commonwealth v. Bumpus,- Mass.-, 238 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1968): 
Reasonable confrontations of this type, in the course of (or immediately 
following) a criminal episode, seem to us to be wholly different from post-
indictment confrontations (such as those in the Wade and Gilbert cases) 
in serious crimes after a significant interval of time, and in the absence of 
already appointed counsel. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
not applied the principle of the Wade and Gilbert cases in such circum-
stances. Until we have more guidance than at present about the scope of 
necessary application of these cases, we shall regard them as not intended 
to apply to facts like those in the case at bar. This is an area where proper 
police protection of the public may be greatly embarrassed by rigid rules 
restricting intelligent, fair police action. Such action must be appraised 
with commonsense appreciation of the problems which confront policemen 
patrolling a residential area. 
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of showing of independent basis by the prosecution will suffice to 
rebut such a presumption? An attempt to answer these questions will 
comprise the subject matter of this Note. 
II 
THE TOTALITY TEST 
The language in both Stoval[.l.8 and W ade19 indicates that, in 
considering the totality of circumstances surrounding any pretrial 
identification, the fact that such identification is conducted, in effect, 
as a one-to-one confrontation weighs heavily against its validity. On 
the other hand, the presence of certain other facts in the totality may 
serve either to justify an improperly conducted identification or to rebut 
the presumption that the defendant has been prejudiced by the allegedly 
suggestive confrontation. The cases following Stovall suggest that there 
are presently two types of situations in which courts are willing to find 
that apparently suggestive pretrial confrontations do not violate due 
process. One line of cases has upheld the use of questionable identifica-
tion procedures where, despite the presentation of the defendant in 
a one-to-one situation, the court believed that factors external to the 
confrontation itself tended to prove that the witness' identification was 
accurate and hence not prejudicial to the defendant.20 The other line 
of cases has held that showups are legally justified where the use of 
fairer identification procedures would entail risk to societal interests 
disproportionate to any prejudice defendant might suffer. For example, 
in Stovall the showup was "imperative" because there was a good 
chance that the only witness to the crime would have died before a less 
suggestive procedure could have been employed.21 These two judicial 
approaches to the totality test must be scrutinized carefully in order to 
determine what considerations should properly be taken into account 
in deciding whether a pretrial confrontation violates due process. 
A. Court's Appraisal of the Accuracy of a Suggestive Confrontation 
U11ited States ex rei. Rutherford v. Deegan,22 a Second Circuit 
decision, is a paradigm of the cases which have attempted to evaluate 
18 "The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of 
identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned." Stovall 
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,302 (1967). 
19 "And the vice of suggestion created by the identification in Stovall . . . 
was the presentation to the witness of the suspect alone handcuffed to police 
officers. It is hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the suggestion 
to the witness that the one presented is believed guilty by the police." United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967). 
20 United States ex rei. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969), 
is the case used by this Note as a vehicle for critical examination of this approach 
to the due process validity of showups and other identification confrontations. 
See also Cline v. United States, 395 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968); Hanks v. United 
States, 388 F.2d 171 (lOth Cir. 1968). 
21 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967). See also Biggers v. Ten-
nessee, 390 U.S. 4().1. (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
22 406 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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the accuracy of the identifications resulting from suggestive pretrial 
confrontations. In Rutherford the witness, whose cleaning establish-
ment had been robbed, was called to the police station to examine 
a suspect. At the station house the witness viewed the defendant, a 
Negro, in a room with several white detectives by means of a one-way 
mirror, and immediately identified him as the criminal. 
The court of appeals in Rutherford rejected an interpretation of 
Stovall which would find showup-type identifications per se violations 
of due process in the absence of compelling circumstances.23 Holding that 
the identification of the defendant was probably accurate, regardless 
of the prejudicial nature of the confrontation, Judge Medina placed 
great emphasis on the following facts: ( 1) that the witness had for 
some five minutes closely watched the two men who had committed 
the robbery, making a deliberate attempt to study the face of the 
criminal who rifled her pocketbook; (2) that the witness had 20-20 
vision; and (3) that the witness had worked closely with Negroes and 
contended that she had no difficulty distinguishing one from another.21 
Thus finding no violation of due process, Rutlzerford sanctioned the 
state's admission into evidence of the witness' in-court identification, 
and would have admitted evidence of the pretrial identification had it 
been offered.25 
The approach to the totality test adopted by the Rutherford court 
had apparent support in two Supreme Court decisions following Stovall. 
In Simmons v. United States,26 the Court validated a photographic 
showup relying, at least in part, upon its belief that there was little 
chance that a misidentification had taken place because the witnesses 
had an excellent opportunity to observe the criminals during the rob-
bery. In Biggers v. Tennessee,21 the Court, splitting four-to-four, 
affirmed a conviction resting upon a showup identification. Significantly, 
Justice Douglas in his dissent considered factors similar to those 
weighed by the courts in both Simmons and Rutherford, although he 
reasoned that, on the facts of the case, the accuracy of the identification 
was in doubt and, therefore, the confrontation violated due process.2s 
However, whether or not the Rutherford approach to totality has 
indeed been sanctioned by the Supreme Court is questionable. More-
over, regardless of a court's professed ability to gauge the accuracy of 
suggestive pretrial identifications, there are important considerations 
which militate against permitting the introduction of any showup 
identification into evidence. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Although the admissibility of the pretrial identification was not at issue, 
since the prosecutor chose to rely upon the in-court identification, the court's 
finding that the prior identification was compatible with due process opened to 
the prosecution the opportunity of admitting it into evidence. Id. 
26 391 u.s. 377 (1968). 
27 391 u.s. 404 (1968). 
28 Id. at 407-08. 
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1. The Inherent Suggestibility of a Showup 
Obviously the possibility of misidentification is present whenever 
an identification confrontation is conducted. However, the relative 
danger of mistake depends on the manner in which a suspect is pre-
sented to a witness. 
Wade outlined in detail the reasons why lineups are peculiarly 
susceptible to prejudicial suggestion on the part of police officers.29 The 
Court held that the sL'!:th amendment required counsel's presence at 
such confrontations not only to preserve meaningful cross-examination 
at trial, but also to enable counsel to deter the police from unneces-
sarily suggesting a suspect's guilt or to correct any situation in which 
he detected potential prejudice to his client.30 However, counsel's 
presence at a showup cannot offer defendant the same degree of protec-
tion from prejudicial suggestion that it offers him at a lineup.31 By 
its very nature, a showup hints at the suspect's guilt. At the minimum, 
the presentation of a suspect to a witness in a one-to-one situation 
suggests that the police initially had reason for holding this particular 
person. This suggestion could very well influence the witness to make 
a positive identification where he otherwise might not, had the suspect 
been presented in a fairly conducted lineup. Since protection against 
showup-type practices is one of the basic needs underlying the right to 
counsel at lineups,32 the salutary effect of counsel's presence at a showup 
would appear to be minimal. 
2. A Critique of Rutherford 
Apart from any consideration of in-court identifications, an exam-
ination must be made of the Rutherford approach to totality regarding 
the admissibility of pretrial identifications.33 The clear implication of 
Stovall is that the former type of evidence is excluded when the defense 
is able to prove that the identification was the product of a confronta-
tion which violated due process.34 Rutherford held that, in judging the 
merit of such a claim, it is permissible for a court to weigh against 
the fact that a confrontation was conducted as a showup, evidence 
indicating that the witness could have identified the suspect absent 
the suggestive confrontation.35 
From the preceding examination of the prejudicial suggestion 
2!l United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-39 (1967). 
30 See notes 7 & 8 supra and accompanying te.""tt. 
31 See note 36 infra. 
32 See note 41 infra. 
33 See discussion of the admissibility of in-court identifications in Part III 
'below. 
34 Nowhere in StovaU does the Court e.""tpressly mention the fate which be-
falls a pretrial identification conducted in derogation of due process. From the 
-discussion of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), appearing in Gil-
bert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967), it seems unquestionable that such 
:an identification is absolutely inadmissible. 
3ti United States ex rei. Rutherford v. Deegan, 406 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1969). 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 382 1969
382 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:377 
which is built into the showup confrontation, it is clear that the showup 
is fraught with the possibility of misidentification. Indeed, it is the 
overwhelming opinion of experts in the field of evidence that identifica-
tions procured at confrontations which focus upon a single suspect are 
highly unreliable.36 Consequently, it would appear that it is umzeces-
sarily37 suggestive and, hence, violative of due process for the police 
to present an accused in a showup when they are unable to offer a 
justification for their failure to conduct a proper lineup. To be sure, 
a court may surmise, as did the court in Rutherford, that on the basis 
of facts external to the confrontation itself no mistake was made in 
the identification. But no judicial guesswork, however discerning, would 
be needed if the police were required to conduct pretrial lineups when-
ever practicable. In short, while the police should be free to continue 
to use showup identifications as an investigatory tool, the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment in federal cases and that of the four-
teenth in state proceedings should bar the prosecution from admitting 
such identifications into evidence, unless it can sustain the burden of 
proving compelling reasons for not employing fairer identification 
procedures. 
The above position finds support by analogy to the evidentiary 
rules established in Wade. Wade explicitly adopted a per se exclusionary 
rule in the case of evidence procured at a confrontation without coun-
sel.38 There are two reasons for total exclusion, both of which are 
applicable to identifications made at pretrial showups. There is first 
the immediate need of preventing the use of unreliable evidence. This 
rationale is even more persuasive in the case of showups. While the 
Court in Stovall admitted that there was a good possibility that many 
of the lineups conducted before the Wade decision had been fair and 
nonsuggestive,39 it is quite apparent that prejudicial suggestion always 
exists in one-to-one confrontations.4o 
The second basis for the per se exclusionary rule is prophylactic-
to deter the police from carrying out identification procedures in the 
absence of counsel. While counsel, having witnessed the confrontation, 
may be able to reveal prejudicial police tactics during trial, his presence 
is also needed to inhibit the police from turning a lineup into a one-to-
one confrontation.41 Therefore, it would be anomalous indeed for a 
36 Wigmore has said that "in modern times . . . there is no e:1:cuse for 
jeopardizing the fate of innocent men by such clumsy antiquated methods; a 
recognition under such circumstances is next to worthless." 4 J. Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 1130 n.2 (3d ed. 1940). See generally P. Wall, supra note 4, at 26-40. 
37 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
38 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). See notes 10 & 11 supra and 
accompanying text. 
39 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1967). 
40 See note 36 supra and accompanying text. 
41 Wade recognizes the danger of making the accused stand out at a lineup. 
The main thrust of the right to counsel which it recognized is aimed at procedures 
which do so. 388 U.S. at 232-34. 
Specifically, the danger is that the police's belief of guilt '\\ill " 'communicate 
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court on the one hand to e.\:clude evidence of an identification made 
without counsel and yet, on the other, to admit an identification which 
is the product of a showup confrontation. This conclusion would obtain 
even if the showup were conducted in counsel's presence but without 
his acquiescence. 
3. Js the Rutherford Approach Mandated by Recent Supreme Court 
Decisions? 
Stovall itself is certainly not authority for the Rutherford court's 
approach to totality since, in the former case, the Court approved the 
showup because there was pressing need for its use, and not because it 
considered the identification free from the possibility of mistake.42 In 
fact, the Court in Wade said of the showup conducted in Stovall, "It is 
hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the suggestion to 
the witness that the one presented is believed guilty by the police."43 
Yet in the face of this admission, the Stovall Court condoned the use 
of the showup since it was highly possible that the victim-witness 
would die before alternative, fairer procedures could be arranged.44 
Wright v. United States,4'J decided before the Supreme Court's 
decision in Simmons, highlights the uncertainty with which courts view 
the totality approach to due process announced in Stovall. There, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to decide 
on the record whether, in light of Stovall, the failure to conduct a 
itself even in a doubtful case to the witne...<s in some way ... .' " Id. at 235, quoting 
Williams & Hammelmann, supra note 6, at 483. The e.""mroples the Wade Court gives 
of suggestive presentations arc almost e.'clusivcly those where the only prejudice is. 
that the defendant was made to stand out. For e.'ample, the Court found the 
following lineups so comprised as to be extremely suggestive: a) sL' men of whom 
defendant was the only Oriental, b) all but one member had light hair, c) all 
older men e.'cept one youth, where the perpetrator was known to be a youth, 
d) all but the suspect were known to the identifying witness, e) the suspect is. 
pointed out before or during the lineup, and f) all participants are asked to try on 
an article of clothing which fits only the suspect. See 388 U.S. at 232-33. 
The Court also lists prejudicial practices used outside of the lineup setting: 
a) an actual showup, defendant being brought before the witness alone, b) allowing 
the witne...<s to identify in the presence of other witne...<ses, and c) presenting the 
suspect in handcuffs. Id. It seems clear, then, that Wade is almost exclusively at-
tacking the practice of spotlighting. 
42 In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), the Court found that 
despite the degree of suggestion inherent in the showup which was involved therein, 
it survived a due process attack, since, in the Court's words, it was "imperative.'~ 
The Court found persuasive the reasons advanced by the Court of Appeals: "Here 
was the only person ... who could possibly e.'onerate Stovall .... No one knew 
how long [the witness] might live. Faced with the responsibility of identifying 
the attacker, with the need for immediate action and with the knowledge that 
[the witness] could not visit the jail, the police followed the only feasible pro-
cedure and took Stovall to the hospital room. Under these circumstances, the 
usual police station lineup •.. was out of the question.'' United States v. Denno~ 
355 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1966). 
43 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 2'18, 234 (1967). 
44 See note 42 supra and accompanying te.,t. 
4G 404 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
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lineup where practicable was a per se violation of due process. Rather, 
the court remanded to the district court for further findings of fact. 
The court intimated that in passing on these additional findings it 
would consider relevant, but not conclusive, the question of whether or 
not a lineup was feasible.46 In addition, the court was willing to review 
factors, such as those found controlling in Rutherford, which went to 
the accuracy of the witness' pretrial identification.47 
Chief Judge Bazelon, dissenting, also urged remand for additional 
fact-finding. However, he disagreed with the majority as to the relevant 
factors which should be considered on remand. Reasoning that the only 
question which had any bearing on the issue of due process was whether 
or not a lineup was feasible, Judge Bazelon set forth a brief but con-
vincing criticism of the approach to totality later employed in Ruther-
ford: 
[D]ue process is violated whenever police unjustifiably fail to hold a 
lineup .... "[I]n the present context, where so many variables and pit-
falls exist, the first line of defense must be the prevention of unfairness 
and the lessening of the hazards of eyewitness identification at the lineup 
itself .... " In other words, we must insist on the fairest feasible identi-
fication procedures and not rely on the courts' ability to gauge the psy-
chological effects of more suggestive procedures.4S 
Subsequent to Wright the Supreme Court in Simmons v. United 
States49 again passed on the validity of the one-to-one confrontation. 
Although the Court considered whether the witness' showup identifica-
tion was accurate,50 it did not do so until it had found that the reasons 
militating against the use of a lineup in that case were as strong as 
those present in StovaU.51 Consequently, Simmons too can be read as 
a case of "compelling" circumstances. Moreover, since the affirmation 
in Biggers was the product of a four-to-four vote it has no precedential 
value.52 Interestingly, while Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent noted that a 
showup does not always violate due process and considered the un-
favorable conditions for observation at the scene of the crime, he 
directed his attack primarily at the lack of circumstances compelling 
the use of such a questionable procedure.53 Thus, it seems safe to con-
clude that the Supreme Court has never upheld a showup under the 
fact pattern presented in Rutherford-the presentation of a suspect in 
a one-to-one situation and the state's failure to offer any justification 
for not employing a fairer identification procedure. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1262 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). 
49 390 u.s. 377 (1968). 
50 Id. at 385. 
51 Id. 
52 Biggers v. Tennessee, 390 U.S. 404 (1968). 
53 Id. at 407. 
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B. Compelling Circumstances 
Since showup identifications are extremely untrustworthy, the 
purpose of the exclusionary rule urged above is to encourage the police, 
at the risk of losing a pretrial identification as evidence of a suspect's 
guilt, to employ fairer identification procedures. However, where it is 
important to make an identification quickly, and where it would be 
impossible to provide counsel and employ a lineup without sacrificing an 
expeditious identification, the police should be permitted to use showup 
techniques in spite of the risk of prejudice.54 Indeed, such exigent 
circumstances insulated the showup in Stovall from a due process 
attack.51' Moreover, the Simmons Court described the facts before it 
as "compelling" in holding that the police there had justification to 
use a showup.fi6 Furthermore, while in Peyton v. Palmer, the lone case 
cited by the Court in Stovall for the proposition that a confrontation 
could be conducted in violation of due process, the court found the 
use of a voice showup to be unconstitutional, it implied that under 
certain conditions such a procedure could be justified.57 Two recent 
cases, Commonwealth v. Bumpus58 and United States v. Davis/'9 are 
excellent vehicles for examining just what circumstances are sufficiently 
compelling to warrant the use of makeshift identification procedures. 
In Bumpus, defendant was convicted of breaking and entering a 
building at night with intent to steal.60 The victim of the crime had 
pretended to be asleep while observing a man making a search of his 
room. When the intruder left the apartment, the victim called the 
police, who came immediately to investigate. The police then left to 
search for the suspect. Shortly thereafter, they arrested defendant for 
breaking and entering, and brought him to the victim's apartment for 
identification. The victim positively identified defendant at that time 
as well as at the subsequent trial. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts found that the one-to-one identification of Bumpus did 
ll4 Of course the showup techniques used when lineups are impossible should 
themselves be as fair as circumstances permit. If, for e.'l:ample, the police are un-
necessarily abusive to the suspect when presented, the court should feel free to hold 
that while the showup technique was warranted by the circumstances, it was 
conducted in an unnecessarily suggestive way and hence was violative of due process. 
ISil See note 42 supra and accompanying te.'l:t. But were the circumstances in 
StovaU such that alternative procedures could not have been used without great 
inconvenience and pain to the victim-witness who was a patient in a hospital at 
the time of the identification? Could several persons resembling Stovall have been 
brought in with him? See Crume v. Beto, 383 F.2d 36, 41 (5th Cir. 1967). 
56 390 u.s. 377, 385 (1968). 
ll7 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966). The court assailed the fact that the sheriff 
"offered no e.'l:planation for the failure to afford .•• [the person making the identi-
fication] at least a choice among several voices, rather than concentrating solely 
on Palmer's." Id. at 202. 
us - Mass -, 238 N.E.2d 343 (1968). 
li9 399 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1968). 
oo Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 16 (11959). 
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not violate due process and, hence, permitted both the pretrial and 
in-court identifications to be admitted into evidence.61 In so holding, 
the court found that because the presentation was made so soon after 
the attempted burglary, the witness' memory was still fresh and there-
fore the procedure increased rather than decreased the chance of an 
accurate identification.62 
In Davis, a state trooper saw defendant walking on a New York 
State Thruway near an abandoned automobile. After arresting Davis 
for walking on the Thruway in violation of a traffic ordinance,63 the 
trooper checked to see if the abandoned car had been reported stolen. 
The check proved negative and Davis denied having any connection 
with the car. Driving through a toll booth on his way off the Thruway, 
the trooper, pointing to Davis who was sitting in the back seat, asked 
the toll collector if he had seen him recently. The booth operator 
identified Davis as the person who had, a short while before, driven 
through his stall an automobile fitting the description of the one aban-
doned. Later when the abandoned car turned out to have been stolen, 
Davis was convicted of auto theft at a trial in which the toll collector 
identified him as the person who drove the stollen car up to the booth. 
Davis' claim that his right to counsel was abridged was rejected by 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Although the court was 
not formally presented with the allegation that the individual con-
frontation violated due process under Stovall, there are indications that 
the Davis court actually considered the presentation to be a showup, 
and upheld its validity on a consideration of the totality of circum-
stances.64 The court answered the contention that counsel was required 
at the toll booth confrontation by holding that such confrontation had 
not yet become accusatory and hence did not take place at a critical 
stage of the criminal proceedings.65 The court agreed, pointing to the 
61 Commonwealth v. Bumpus,- Mass.-,-, 238 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1968). 
62 Id. at-, 238 N.E.2d at 346-47. 
63 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 102.2 (1966). 
64 The only claim pressed by appellant in Davis was that he had been de-
prived of his right to counsel at the presentation. The question of primary interest 
to this Note is whether or not that confrontation could have been invalidated on 
due process grounds. The Court's reasoning seems equally applicable to a claim 
of deprivation of right to counsel under Wade. 
65 399 F.2d at 952. Many of the considerations which are relevant to the due 
process validity of a confrontation under Stovall are relevant to the determination 
of when counsel is required at such presentations. 
Escobedo v. lliinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964), in effect, holds that, in 
interrogation cases, the right to counsel accrues no later than the shift of the pro-
ceedings from the investigatory to the accusatory stage. Bttmpus and Davis held 
that the accusatory test applies to identification cases. The confrontations in Bumpus 
and Davis were validated on the ground that the accusatory stage had not been 
reached. 
Is this a good test in the normal confrontation case? Are not all such one-to-
one confrontations accusatory in the sense that they ask one who witnessed the 
crime whether the person presented is the criminal being sought? See Rivers v. 
United States, 400 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1968). Is not the unusual situation 
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fact that at the time the identification was made, neither the trooper 
nor, more importantly, the toll-booth operator knew that a crime had 
been committed, and further, the operator had no reason to know why 
the presentation was being made.66 
The two prime reasons running through both Bumpus and Davis 
for validating the showups are: (1) the belief that since the police 
should not be hampered in their attempt to prevent and investigate 
crime, the procedural rights created by Wade, Gilbert and Stovall 
attach only at the accusatory stage of the proceeding and not until 
the police have completed the investigatory stage; 67 and (2) the im-
portance of making an identification as soon as possible after the 
crime, while memories are still fresh.6s 
If properly applied, the accusatory-investigatory approach69 seems 
sound. It is essential to note at the outset that this dichotomy 
is far from clear cut. The showup conducted in Bumpus was certainly 
accusatory in the sense that it communicated to the witness that the 
police had reason to suspect Bumpus as the criminal. The question 
posed to the victim-witness was, "Is this the man who you just saw 
break into your house?" It is in fact this accusatory suggestion, 
whether express or implied, which makes showups so prejudicial,7° On 
the other hand, the one-man confrontation in Bumpus was essential to 
good police investigation. When the police arrest a suspect near the 
scene of a crime soon after its commission, it is imperative that they 
ascertain whether their choice is correct so that, if wrong, they can 
resume their search while the criminal is still within easy reach. To 
require the police to take a suspect back to the stationhouse for a 
lineup would interrupt the investigation while additional police were 
sent to the vicinity of the crime. In each case a court must weigh the 
danger which inheres in all showups against the practical need involved 
in an on-the-scene investigation.71 
in Davis the e:~:ception to the generally accusatory nature of showups and defective 
lineups? 
The court in Davis probably considered and rejected, sub silentio, the due 
process claim, since it concluded that the "trilogy do not cover this case." 399 F.2d 
at 952. 
66 Id. 
67 Commonwealth v. Bumpus, - Mass. -, -, 238 N.E.2d 343, 347 (1968} ; 
United States v. Davis, 399 F.2d 948 (2d Cir.1968). 
68 Id. 
69 See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,490-92 (1964). 
70 Hans Gross, in attacking the showup procedure as suggestive of guilt and 
hence conducive to misidentification, gives the blatant example of a witness who 
was asked to view a suspect in such a confrontation. The witness made a positive 
identification of a person not fitting the description he had previously given the 
police. When asked by the authorities about the apparent discrepancy, the wit-
ness answered, "You certainly would not have brought him here if he were not 
the right man." H. Gross, Criminal Psychology 36-37 (1911). 
71 If the judge determines that the showup was essential but that the circum-
stances of the witness' original observation point to the likelihood of mistake, the 
evidence should be admitted with the expectation that it will be impeached on 
cross-e:~:amination. 
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At the time he presented Davis to the toll booth operator, the 
trooper in the Davis case was not certain that an auto theft had been 
committed. To force a police officer to stage a lineup while pursuing 
this sort of hunch would place a tremendous burden on mere pre-
liminary investigations. Moreover, the confrontation in Davis may be 
saved for another reason. At the traditional showup, a witness has a 
specific crime in mind and, as has been mentioned, may be influenced 
by his belief that the police must have some independent evidence that 
the person presented to him is the one who has committed the crime. 
Generally, the witness has observed the commission of the crime and 
knows the police are asking whether the person presented is the perpe-
trator. However, where the person making a one-to-one identification 
does not know why the presentation is being made, as was the case 
with the toll booth operator in Davis, the possibility of misidentification 
is not as great as in the typical showup. In Davis, the witness, having 
no particular criminal transaction in mind, was called upon to match 
the suspect against a wide range of people with whom he had recently had 
contact during his employment in order to determine whether he had 
ever seen the suspect.72 While this Note takes the position that courts 
should be precluded from making an independent judgment of the 
accuracy of a suggestive confrontation without first determining the 
necessity, the confrontation in Davis did not suggest to the witness that 
a specific crime had been committed and that the suspect was thought 
to be the guilty party. It seems reasonable to exclude from the definition 
of a showup one-to-one presentations where the witness has no idea why 
the presentation is being made and the investigating police officer asks 
only, as he did in Davis, "Have you ever seen this man before?" 
The argument that police investigations would be hampered by 
excluding all nonessential showup identifications from being introduced 
into evidence is not persuasive. Such an evidentiary rule would not 
require that police interrupt investigations to hold lineups in every 
case. Rather, such a requirement would apply only if the state chose to 
use a witness' identification as evidence of the defendant's guilt. If they 
chose to use the identification only as an investigatory device, the police 
could still immediately conduct a showup. Subsequently, if the identifi-
cation was negative, they could promptly continue their investigation. 
On the other hand, if the identification proved positive, the police 
72 A one-to-one confrontation under these circumstances is much like a lineup. 
In the latter the witness knows what the police are driving at, i.e., he knows that 
they want him to point out which if any of those presented is the criminal being 
sought. But in such a confrontation the witness does not know which of those 
presented is the suspect. On the other hand, in a Davis-type situation the witness 
knows the person in whom the police are interested, but has no idea why. He has 
seen nothing out of the ordinary which would suggest the response the police are 
eliciting. In a showup the responses can be "yes," "no," or some shade of "I'm not 
sure." In a lineup they can be "yes" for any one of those presented, "no" for all, 
or "I'm not sure" for any number of those presented. In Davis, the toll booth 
operator was able to make a very specific response without prior suggestion. 
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would halt their investigation and gather evidence independent of the 
identification in order to establish the suspect's guilt at trial.73 Waiving 
the evidentiary use of a particular witness' identification to gain its aid 
in an investigation would, of course, not be helpful where there was 
merely one witness to the crime or where the state's case is otherwise 
dependent on the identification. On the other band, if there is no com-
pelling need for the showup as an investigatory tool, its use unnecessarily 
deprives the defendant of the possibility that he will not be identified 
at a lineup. Such non-identification would be valuable e.-..:culpatory 
evidence. 
Given the fact that an identification is made soon after the com-
mission of a crime, it is at least arguable that since the identifying 
witness' memory is still fresh, the probative value of such an identifica-
tion far outweighs any prejudicial suggestion which might inhere in 
the presentation. Indeed, in Wright Judge Bazelon recognized that 
preservation of fresh memories is a compelling consideration sufficient 
to justify a pretrial showup.74 If, as it might be assumed, freshness is 
important, courts could, after a certain amount of case-by-case experi-
ence, develop definite guidelines for determining up to what point in 
time after the witness' original contact with the perpetrator, the delay 
occasioned by staging a lineup would be material to freshness of mem~ 
ory. For example, if it normally takes a day to arrange a lineup, the 
value of presenting the suspect to a witness five minutes after the 
commission of the crime at least arguably outweighs the benefits of a 
lineup procedure. If a suspect is apprehended a month after the crime, 
the twenty-four hour delay in arranging a lineup would not seem to 
have a substantial effect on freshness of memory; the countervailing 
danger of misidentification occasioned by the showup procedure would 
be even greater at this time than it would have been five minutes after 
the witness saw the criminal transaction. While prior to a certain point 
in time the police could present a suspect singly to a witness and still 
be permitted to introduce the resulting identification into evidence at 
trial, after such time the police would be required to place the suspect 
in a lineup in order to preserve the evidentiary value of the identifi-
cation. 
73 It might be argued that independent evidence thus secured is inadmissible 
as fruit of the poisonous tree, i.e., the prior showup. The argument seems specious 
because any causal link between the showup identification and subsequent non-
identification evidence is tenuous. 
74 Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1968). "The clear thrust 
of Stovall is that without justifying circumstances, a one-man showup is too un-
necessarily suggestive to satisfy due process. A lineup must be conducted unless it 
will necessitate a delay which is likely to make identification impossible or less 
reliable." Id. at 1262 (Bazelon, C. J ., dissenting). 
From the above it seems clear that the necessity to make an identification 
quickly while memories are fresh would be recognized by Judge Bazelon as a com-
pelling circumstance sometimes justifying the use of the showup procedure. 
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ESTABLISHING THE INDEPENDENT BASIS 
OF AN IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION 
[Vol. 44:377 
Although in Wright Chief Judge Bazelon disagreed with the 
majority as to what factors should be weighed in determining whether 
a pretrial confrontation violates due process, there was agreement that 
the evidentiary rules promulgated in Wade and Gilbert should be 
applied analogously once a violation is found.75 While an identification 
made at a violative confrontation should be absolutely inadmissible, 
the in-court identification of the defendant made by the witness who had 
previously identified him at an unconstitutional presentation should 
also be inadmissible, unless the state can demonstrate by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the in-court identification had a source other 
than the improper confrontation.76 The evidence and procedures which 
should be required to rebut the presumption that an in-court identifi-
cation is tainted by an invalid pretrial confrontation remains an open 
question. The reasoning and conclusions developed herein are equally 
applicable to the question of establishing an independent basis for an 
in-court identification following a pretrial confrontation conducted 
without counsel in violation of Wade. 
It would appear from a close reading of Wade that the test for 
determining the independence of an in-court identification is whether it 
can be said with any degree of certainty that at the time of the trial 
the witness would have recognized the defendant in a fairly conducted 
lineup had the violative confrontation not intervened.77 Since in any 
case where independence is at issue a violative confrontation must have 
intervened, how are courts to determine what would have happened if 
an intervening violative confrontation had not occurred? 
It has been suggested in Part II of this Note that a court's con-
sideration of the accuracy of an identification made at a showup does 
not control its validity or determine its admissibility at trial. However, 
once a due process violation is found, the factors considered by the court 
in Rutherford are very relevant to the question of whether an in-court 
identification has a source independent of the tainted showup.78 Among 
the factors which Wade listed as establishing the independence of the 
in-court identification are two which the court employed in Rutherford: 
(1} "the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act"; and 
75 !d. See also Clemons v. United States, No. 21,001 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 6, 
1968); United States v. Washington, 292 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1968}. 
76 Cf. the dispositional principles in Wade and Gilbert discussed in notes 10 & 
11 supra and accompanying text. 
77 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967). See also United States 
v. Trivette, 284 F. Supp. 720 (D.D.C. 1968), where the court in deciding inde-
pendence asked itself whether or not the witness could have made an in-court 
identification free of the effects of the violative pretrial identification. 
78 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967). 
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(2) "the e...Ostence of any discrepancy [or lack of discrepancy] between 
any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description.7779 
However, conceding that the above considerations are relevant to 
the determination of an independent basis, it should not be assumed that 
they are the last word on the subject. While it is impossible for a court 
to know with any degree of certainty whether an in-court identification 
is accurate once a prior, improper confrontation has been conducted, a 
procedure can be followed that will act as a preliminary check on the 
accuracy of the identification made at trial: conducting a lineup im-
mediately prior to trial whenever the prosecution intends to make use 
of an in-court identification. In short, if a witness cannot pick the 
defendant out of a properly conducted lineup before trial, there is 
little sense in speaking of his ability to make an independent identifica-
tion at trial. After all, an in-court identification is a showup made 
more suggestive than most, since the state's belief in defendant's guilt 
is thus emphatically communicated to the witness.80 
It is urged that in determining the independence of a proposed 
in-court identification, the courts should order a pretrial lineup to be 
conducted to resolve the primary question of whether an identification 
can be made at all. Such a procedure seems a small price to pay for 
a check on the independence of in-court identifications, a check which 
can conclusively demonstrate the witness' inability to identify the de-
fendant. "With the stakes so high, due process does not permit second 
best. . • . [W] e must insist on the fairest feasible identification pro-
cedures .... "81 
The seeds of such a procedure may be found in Wade. Besides the 
considerations mentioned above, Wade looked to the prior unsuccessful 
identification by the witness.82 Requiring a pretrial lineup merely 
institutionalizes this factor. An efficient method for implementing this 
procedure would be for courts to initially consider factors such as the 
conditions under which the witness observed the criminal at the time 
of the crime. If after weighing such criteria the judge is convinced that 
the in-court identification would be tainted by the prior improper con-
70 Id. 
80 If the danger in showup cases is that the police may communicate to the 
witness their belief in the defendant's guilt, as it seems to be (see note 19 supra), 
then an in-court showup is most suggestive of all. Traditionally, such procedure 
has been allowed without question. See, e.g., State v. Roberts,- Ore.-, 437 P.2d 
731 (1968); Green v. State, 223 Ind. 614, 63 N.E.2d 292 (1945); Boyd v. State, 
SO Te.'i:. Crim. 138, 94 S.W. 1053 (1906). If a lineup is required to determine the 
independence of an in-court identification following a violative predecessor as is 
urged above, one should be required where the in-court identification follows no 
other confrontation. Under such circumstances the court would have the oppor-
tunity to determine positively whether or not the witness can identify the accused 
at the time of trial under fair conditions. 
81 Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, 
C. J ., dissenting). 
82 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967). See note 76 supra and 
accompanying text. 
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frontation, the identification at trial should not be permitted, and a 
lineup would prove unnecessary. On the other hand, if the judge finds 
that an in-court identification might have an independent basis, as the 
court found in Rutherford, a lineup should be conducted, since it 
might detect error in his initial determination. 
If the witness identifies defendant at a pretrial lineup, conducted 
as a test of the witness' ability to make an in-court identification, the 
lineup identification should not itself be admissible. Since this lineup 
is merely designed as a partial check for independence, it should not 
be used to arm the prosecution with impressive evidence. 
The determination of the issue of independence, as well as the 
question of the due process validity of the pretrial confrontation, should 
be made before trial on a motion to suppress.83 When such objection is 
raised in this manner and either or both identifications are suppressed, 
the jury has heard nothing which might unfairly influence its decision. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Ideally an identification is a matching of past and present sense 
impressions. When a witness is presented with a group of persons, 
roughly similar in appearance, he is forced to rely on the strength of 
his past impression. As the witness realizes that a particular person 
is suspected by the police, the danger increases that the identification 
will be a mere ratification of the arrest. Hence, practices which spot-
light the accused are those particularly to be avoided. The showup is 
by its very nature the epitome of such suggestive practices. An identifi-
cation which is the product of a nonessential showup, even if conducted 
in counsel's presence, should not be admissible in evidence. 
It is clear from Stovall that where the showup is the only practi-
cable method of identification, necessity justifies its use. While the 
Supreme Court has never invalidated an identification on due process 
grounds,84 it has never validated a nonessential showup and it is sub-
mitted that finding such procedures violative of due process is the 
necessary end-product of Wade, Gilbert and Stovall. 
83 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 292 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1968); 
United States v. Wilson, 283 F. Supp. 914 (D.D.C. 1968); State v. Bratten, - Del. 
-, 245 A.2d 556 (1968). 
84 At the time this note was originally sent to the printer, the Supreme Court 
had itself never invalidated a confrontation on the ground that it was so unneces-
sarily suggestive as to violate due process of law. Subsequently, in Foster v. Cali-
fornia, 37 U.SL.W. 4281 (U.S. April 1, 1969), the Court has so ruled. In Foster, 
the defendant was originally presented to the witness in a lineup in which defendant 
was the only tall man. When that confrontation failed to produce an identification, 
the police presented the defendant in a showup, but still no identification was forth-
coming. A positive identification was finally procured when the police again presented 
the defendant to the witness, this time in a lineup otherwise comprised of new 
members. 
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Since an identification at trial is likely to be influenced by a prior 
confrontation, the state should bear a heavy burden in showing that 
it is independent of its violative predecessor. A conclusive determination 
of independence is of course impossible, but such an identification 
should be precluded if the witness is unable to identify the defendant 
at a pretrial lineup. 
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